- Social Hub
- Offering
- Resources
- News and Analysis
- Tools
- Education
- Company
News and Analysis
Share the article:
Cristian Cochintu
The Central Bank of Egypt is expected to maintain its current policy rates of 27.25% and 28.25% until inflation continues its downward trend. Analysts forecast that as inflation declines from around 20% in 2024 to approximately 12% in 2025, the CBE may start a cautious monetary easing cycle. Risks of a rate cut by late 2025 remain, as real interest rates could turn positive, supporting economic growth.
Will Egypt maintain its current currency policies? What has driven the pound’s significant depreciation, and how might reforms impact future valuation? In this article, we examine the currency’s recent performance and analysts’ latest Egyptian pound (EGP) forecasts and price predictions.
Egyptian Pound Forecast & Price Predictions – Key Takeaways
- Egyptian Pound forecast in the coming days: Analysts suggest the EGP/USD rate could stabilize near the 50.00 mark as the government implements fiscal and monetary reforms.
- Egyptian Pound forecast for 2025: The Egyptian pound is expected to gradually weaken, with the exchange rate reaching approximately EGP 54–55/USD by the end of 2025.
- Egyptian Pound forecast for 2025-2030: Over the medium term, a gradual decline may continue, potentially placing the EGP/USD exchange rate around the low-60s range by the early 2030s. This trajectory will depend on reform progress, inflation control, and foreign investment flows.
The Egyptian pound (EGP) has experienced intense pressure in recent years, marked by multiple sharp devaluations. Since early 2022, the currency has lost over 70% of its value against the U.S. dollar. This erosion reflects underlying economic imbalances and policy adjustments. In response, Egyptian authorities have embarked on a broad reform agenda – supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – to stabilize the macroeconomy.
This report provides a structured analysis of key fundamental factors influencing the EGP over the medium to long term (1–5 years), including inflation, monetary and fiscal policies, debt dynamics, external balances, and geopolitical risks. We conclude with an EGP/USD exchange rate outlook based on these factors.
Egypt has been grappling with surging inflation, which directly erodes the purchasing power of the EGP and weighs on its valuation. Headline Inflation soared to a record 38.0% in September 2023 amid global commodity shocks. This was exacerbated by currency devaluations that drove up import prices. However, inflation showed signs of moderation by late 2024, easing to about 24–26% as base effects kicked in and domestic demand cooled. Analysts expect inflation to continue decelerating over the coming years if tight monetary policy is maintained and supply bottlenecks ease.
According to a Reuters poll, inflation is forecast to average around 20% in FY2024/25 and decline to 12% by FY2025/26, closer to (but still above) the Central Bank of Egypt’s 7% (+/-2) target range. Lower inflation would be positive for the EGP’s stability, as it could restore some investor confidence and reduce the need for destabilizing devaluations. Conversely, any resurgence of price pressures (for example, from subsidy cuts or supply shocks) could undermine the pound by renewing real exchange rate misalignments, necessitating further adjustments.
To combat runaway inflation and support the currency, the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) has pursued an aggressive monetary tightening cycle. The CBE hiked benchmark rates by 1,000 bps (10 percentage points) in 2022 and further in 2023, bringing the overnight deposit rate to 27.25% and lending rate to 28.25% by late 2024. These are the highest interest rates in decades, aimed at curbing inflation and attracting foreign capital into EGP assets.
High rates have significantly raised domestic borrowing costs, but they helped slow price increases and narrowed the gap between official and parallel market exchange rates. Going forward, with inflation projected to ease, monetary policy is expected to gradually loosen. Fitch Ratings anticipates the CBE will start cutting rates in 2025, potentially by a cumulative 10 percentage points over the next year as inflation falls into the low teens.
In line with this, economists surveyed by Reuters see the lending rate dropping to 24% by mid-2025 (from 28.25% currently) and further to 17.75% by mid-2026. Such easing, if realized, could stimulate investment and growth; however, the CBE is likely to proceed cautiously. Maintaining a positive real interest rate is crucial to sustain foreign investor appetite for Egyptian debt and prevent renewed capital flight that would pressure the pound. Overall, a delicate balancing act is in play – the pace of rate cuts will depend on inflation dynamics and exchange-rate stability.
Should inflation prove stickier than hoped, the CBE may delay easing to defend the currency, which would in turn slow economic recovery. In the chart below, one can observe the correlation between the interest rates and the EGP/USD exchange rate.
And to place in context the magnitude of the current interest rates one gets a better view when looking at rates dating back to 2002:
AI-generated content may be incorrect.">
Egypt’s fiscal position is a key factor for currency stability in the medium term. Years of large budget deficits (averaging ~9.5% of GDP in the past decade) have pushed government debt to high levels, making the economy vulnerable. The public debt-to-GDP ratio jumped to about 95% in FY2022/23 (fiscal year ending June 2023), up from ~87% the previous year, largely due to the weaker pound increasing the local currency value of foreign debt. High debt and deficits strain confidence in the EGP, especially when a growing share of revenues is absorbed by debt service.
Worryingly, interest payments are projected to exceed 50% of government revenues by FY2024/25 – an exceptionally high burden that limits fiscal flexibility and can stoke concerns of fiscal dominance (pressuring the central bank to accommodate deficits). In response, authorities are implementing fiscal reforms under the IMF program: reducing subsidies, containing the public wage bill, and aiming to generate primary budget surpluses (i.e. surplus before interest costs) to stabilize debt.
The government has indeed achieved small primary surpluses in recent years, but these have been outweighed by interest costs. The IMF-supported reform plan (a 46-month Extended Fund Facility approved in Dec 2022) targets a roughly 10 percentage point decline in the debt-to-GDP ratio by the program’s end through fiscal consolidation and higher growth. Additionally, asset sale and privatization programs are being pursued to raise revenue and bolster foreign exchange inflows.
The Finance Ministry has voiced an ambition to cut debt below 85% of GDP in the next few years. If Egypt can credibly rein in its debt trajectory – for example, via spending discipline and pro-growth reforms – it would support the EGP by improving investor sentiment and reducing devaluation risk. Conversely, any slippage on fiscal reforms or a spike in borrowing costs could aggravate debt sustainability fears and put downward pressure on the pound.
Notably, Fitch Ratings cautions that while reforms are underway, the process of stabilizing the debt burden will “take many years” and execution risks remain.
Egypt Government Debt to GDP chart shed more light on the underlying issue:
Robust foreign exchange reserves are critical for cushioning the EGP against external shocks. Egypt’s reserves took a hit in early 2022 as the central bank spent dollars to defend the pound but have since rebounded to record highs with help from international partners. As of December 2024, net international reserves (NIR) reached $47.1 billion, up sharply from $35 billion a year earlier. This ~$12 billion annual jump in 2024 was driven by major foreign inflows – including a landmark $35 billion investment deal with the UAE (for developing the Ras El-Hikma area) that began disbursing funds in 2024. Roughly $24 billion of fresh inflows from that deal (net of some Gulf deposits rolled over) provided a significant boost to FX liquidity.
Additionally, Egypt received financing from multilateral institutions: by late 2024, over $57 billion in packages from the IMF, World Bank, and Gulf allies had been lined up to support Egypt. The surge in reserves bolsters the CBE’s firepower to manage the exchange rate and meet external obligations, which in turn instills confidence in the pound. Indeed, Fitch noted that the UAE deal and associated inflows helped ease Egypt’s liquidity strains and even caused the previously wide black-market (parallel) exchange rate to converge – the parallel rate fell from ~EGP 70/USD in January 2024 to under EGP 50 after the deal’s announcement. This suggests the market views the reserve boost as reducing devaluation risk. Over the medium term, however, sustaining healthy reserves will be an ongoing challenge. Egypt’s balance of payments remains under pressure from a structural trade deficit and hefty external debt service (discussed below).
In 2023, import restrictions and a depreciated currency compressed imports enough to shrink the trade deficit to about $37 billion (down from $48bn in 2022), and a recovery in tourism and Suez Canal revenues improved the current account. Official data show the current account deficit narrowed to roughly 1.1% of GDP in early FY2023/24, a significant improvement. Key foreign exchange-earning industries – tourism, Suez Canal transit, and gas exports – had a mixed performance. Tourism boomed with a record 14.9 million visitors in 2023, helped by the weak EGP making Egypt a cheap destination; Suez Canal earnings hit an all-time high in mid-2023 but then were dented (by ~40% drop in traffic) in late 2023 due to regional security risks; and gas exports fell as domestic energy needs and declining output left less surplus for export. Remittance inflows from Egyptians abroad – normally a large source of FX (over one-third of FX receipts in a typical year) – have also decreased, as more remittances bypass official channels when the parallel market diverges from the official rate.
Looking ahead 1–5 years, balance of payments dynamics will significantly influence the pound. If Egypt secures steady FDI, maintains export growth (e.g. via competitive industries like petrochemicals or new renewable energy projects), and keeps imports in check, the current account gap can remain small, allowing reserves to be preserved. On the other hand, a surge in import demand (from fiscal expansion or commodity price spikes) or setbacks in dollar-earning sectors (e.g. prolonged regional instability hitting tourism or Suez revenues) could widen the external gap and again put the EGP under strain. The authorities’ commitment to a flexible exchange rate implies that if external imbalances re-emerge, the currency will be allowed to adjust rather than drawing down reserves excessively.
Overall, high reserves are a crucial buffer for the currency but sustaining them will require continued reform progress and external support to ensure Egypt can meet its large hard-currency funding needs without resorting to disruptive devaluations.
One can see the correlation between the Forex reserves and EGP’s ability to absorb external shocks:
Egypt’s external debt has grown rapidly and is a double-edged sword for the EGP. On one hand, foreign borrowing has financed development and shored up reserves; on the other, it has created sizeable repayment obligations that pressure the currency. By June 2023, Egypt’s total external debt hit a record $168 billion (from just ~$34 billion in 2012). Thanks in part to recent Gulf financial support and debt reprofiling, external debt dipped slightly to about $153 billion by mid-2024, equal to roughly 39% of GDP. While this debt-to-GDP ratio is moderate by international standards, the debt service is substantial. The Central Bank estimated that $31 billion in external debt service (principal + interest) was due in 2024 alone, including IMF repayments, Eurobond maturities, and loans from bilateral creditors. Such large outflows create continuous demand for hard currency, affecting the supply-demand balance for the EGP.
In 2024, Egypt managed to meet these obligations partly thanks to new inflows (IMF disbursements, Gulf investments) essentially rolling over the exposure. Over the medium term, refinancing needs remain high each year, leaving the pound vulnerable if external financing sources dry up. Encouragingly, the IMF program and associated reforms are expected to reopen access to international bond markets and encourage portfolio inflows, which could help refinance debt at longer maturities. However, investor confidence is key: any doubt about Egypt’s reform commitment or global emerging-market risk aversion could lead to capital outflows instead, weakening the pound.
Fitch Solutions warns that Egypt faces a “huge debt wall” through 2024–2025 and remains dependent on volatile financing (like portfolio investments) to meet its needs. Should planned asset sales or multilateral loans fall short, pressure on the EGP would mount as the government and CBE scramble for dollars. The structure of external debt provides some cushion – about 70% is long-term and much is owed to official partners with whom restructuring or reprofiling is possible. Moreover, Gulf allies have rolled over deposits at the CBE into longer-term investments (as seen with the UAE deal), indicating willingness to support Egypt.
If such support continues and Egypt prudently manages its external obligations (e.g. by spacing out maturities and possibly seeking relief on the most onerous terms), the risks to the currency can be mitigated. In summary, high external debt remains a significant source of vulnerability for the EGP: servicing it will consume a large share of export and fiscal earnings, and confidence in Egypt’s ability to roll over debt will be a major determinant of exchange rate stability in coming years.
Trends in foreign direct investment and other capital flows are crucial for the EGP’s outlook, as they determine the availability of foreign currency in the economy. Historically, Egypt’s net FDI inflows have been modest relative to the size of its economy – averaging around $8–10 billion annually in recent years (about 2–3% of GDP). Bureaucratic hurdles, a large state footprint, and periods of instability have weighed on investor appetite. However, the government has intensified efforts to attract FDI through regulatory reforms, new investment zones, and privatization of state assets.
These efforts started to bear fruit in FY2022/23, when Egypt reportedly attracted FDI inflows of ~$23 billion – a noticeable uptick. The real game-changer was in early 2024: Egypt struck its largest-ever FDI deal with the UAE worth $35 billion for real estate and infrastructure development. As noted, this deal alone is bringing in around $24 billion in fresh hard currency inflows within 2024. Such large equity-based inflows are extremely supportive for the Egyptian pound, as they boost the balance of payments without adding debt. In addition to Gulf investments, authorities aim to tap other sources – for instance, offering stakes in army-owned companies and other state enterprises to strategic foreign investors, and promoting sectors like renewable energy, petrochemicals, and IT outsourcing where Egypt has potential advantages (cheap labor, location, resources).
Privatization receipts and FDI not only supply foreign exchange but also signal investor confidence, which can stabilize or even strengthen the currency. Over the medium term, sustaining high FDI will be vital for the EGP’s health. If Egypt can institutionalize reforms (e.g. ensuring a level playing field for private investors and streamlining business procedures), FDI could remain elevated, helping to cover the external financing gap and reduce reliance on debt. On the other hand, if political or bureaucratic obstacles slow the reform momentum, FDI might retreat. Furthermore, hot money flows (portfolio investment in treasury bills and bonds) have been volatile – tens of billions exited in early 2022, contributing to the currency crunch.
Lately, some portfolio investors have been cautiously returning as the pound’s depreciation creates value and as interest rates in Egypt remain very high. To lock in these flows, confidence in a flexible exchange rate is key. Both the IMF and foreign investors want to see market-determined rates; any return to a heavily managed peg could scare capital away. In summary, steady capital inflows – whether via FDI, equity investments, or returning portfolio money – would reinforce the EGP by improving dollar liquidity. The medium-term trajectory of the pound will thus partially hinge on Egypt’s success in marketing itself as an attractive destination for investment and its adherence to open-market policies.
Egypt’s trade balance has traditionally been in deficit, reflecting a large import bill not fully matched by exports. The country imports most of its needs for food, fuel, and capital goods, while its export base (primarily hydrocarbons, chemicals, agricultural goods, and some manufactures) is relatively narrow. In 2022, surging global commodity prices widened the trade deficit to an unsustainable $48 billion, one of the factors that precipitated the 2022–2023 currency crisis. By 2023, measures were taken to compress imports – including requiring letters of credit for many imports and the currency depreciation itself making imports costlier – which helped shrink the deficit to about $37 billion. Exports have shown some positive signs: non-oil goods exports have risen, and crucially services exports (tourism and Suez Canal fees) have been strong. In fact, despite global headwinds, tourism revenues hit a record high in 2023 (tourist arrivals nearly 15 million), bringing in much-needed foreign currency.
The Suez Canal, another lifeline, contributed roughly $8 billion in revenue in 2022 and remained robust until late 2023 when security issues in the region temporarily diverted ships. On the imports side, Egypt’s biggest import categories are food (especially wheat), fuel, and machinery. High global oil and grain prices in 2022 significantly inflated the import bill, hurting the currency. Looking ahead, several factors will shape trade dynamics: (1) Global commodity prices – a decline in oil/gas and grain prices would relieve pressure on Egypt’s import bill, whereas spikes would strain the EGP; (2) Domestic production – Egypt is trying to boost domestic manufacturing of staples (like fertilizer, steel, consumer goods) and encourage local wheat production to curb imports; progress on these fronts could modestly reduce import dependence over years; (3) Export diversification – new gas field developments, expansion in petrochemicals, and growth in non-traditional exports (such as automobile assembly or electronics) are targeted to increase export revenues.
A promising area is energy transition: Egypt’s abundant sun and wind enable large renewable energy projects, some aimed at producing green hydrogen for export – potentially a significant foreign exchange earner in the long run. Additionally, regional trade integration (for example, supplying electricity to neighbors, or expanding Africa-focused exports) could open new markets. Overall, if Egypt’s reforms lead to a narrower trade deficit – through a combination of higher exports and slightly lower non-essential imports – this will alleviate downward pressure on the EGP.
Key industries like tourism and the Suez Canal will remain pivotal: together they normally account for over 20% of Egypt’s foreign currency earnings. Any shock to these sectors (e.g. prolonged regional conflict or global recession reducing travel) would negatively impact the pound’s fundamentals. Conversely, stability and growth in these sectors provide a natural buffer supporting the currency. The import bill also ties into currency expectations: as Fitch Solutions notes, Egypt’s heavy reliance on imports (such as a ~$20 billion annual cost for petroleum product imports alone) makes the currency vulnerable to import-driven dollar demand spikes.
Thus, policies to improve energy self-sufficiency (like more natural gas production for domestic use) can indirectly help the currency by tempering import needs. In summary, a gradual improvement in the trade balance – even if it remains in deficit – would be a constructive sign, while any deterioration would be a warning sign for further EGP weakness.
Here one can see the past 5 years Trade Balance steadily growing its deficit:
Egypt’s economy and currency are not immune to geopolitics. In fact, several recent geopolitical shocks have directly impacted the EGP’s fundamentals. The Russia-Ukraine war (since 2022) hit Egypt via soaring food and fuel prices – Egypt being one of the world’s largest wheat importers – fueling inflation and straining FX resources, which hastened the pound’s devaluation in 2022.
More recently, the war in Gaza (2023) and instability in Sudan and the Red Sea region have presented new risks. The Gaza conflict led to increased security and political uncertainty, deterring some tourists and causing Egypt to spend on humanitarian and military readiness; it also briefly cut into Suez Canal traffic due to threats to Red Sea shipping, reducing a key revenue stream. These factors contributed to slower growth (Egypt’s GDP growth fell to 2.4% in 2023/24 from 3.8% prior) and added pressure on the currency. Investor sentiment towards Egypt can sour if regional conflicts escalate, as foreign funds typically flee to safety during instability, which can weaken the EGP.
Moreover, Egypt’s reliance on Gulf Arab financial support ties its fortunes somewhat to regional politics: support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar has been generous but could be influenced by geopolitical alignments and Egypt’s domestic policies. Another risk is the global financial environment – while not a geopolitical event per se, rising U.S. interest rates or a strong dollar (often influenced by global risk events) tend to pull capital out of emerging markets like Egypt, weakening their currencies. On the flip side, Egypt stands to gain from certain geopolitical developments: for example, if reconstruction efforts in war-torn neighbors (Libya, Gaza, etc.) take off in coming years, Egyptian firms (and labor) might benefit, boosting exports and remittances.
Additionally, Europe’s quest for energy diversification (away from Russia) could channel more investment into Egyptian gas fields and renewables, benefiting the external account. Nonetheless, downside geopolitical risks dominate the near-term outlook for the EGP. Heightened tensions in the Middle East, whether on Egypt’s borders or involving its Gulf backers, could lead to capital flow reversals or disruptions in trade and tourism. The government’s ability to maintain social stability at home (amid economic hardship) is another factor – serious domestic unrest or political instability would undermine confidence in the currency.
In summary, while geopolitical events are hard to predict or quantify, they form an ever-present backdrop for the Egyptian pound. Periods of regional calm and cooperation will aid Egypt’s economic recovery and currency stability, whereas flare-ups or crises could quickly translate into pressure on the EGP via reduced inflows or costly contingencies.
International financial institutions and aid programs play a pivotal role in Egypt’s economic stability and hence the EGP’s outlook. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in particular, has been a key partner: Egypt is currently under a 46-month IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program (Dec 2022–Oct 2026) worth $3 billion, supplemented by additional financing from the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Facility. The program’s objectives include a sustained shift to a flexible exchange rate, fiscal consolidation, and structural reforms to boost private sector led growth. The IMF has conditioned disbursements on progress in these areas, effectively holding Egypt to its reform commitments. For example, the IMF repeatedly emphasized the need to eliminate the currency peg and clear import backlogs; Egypt’s decision in March 2024 to allow the pound to float more freely (leading to a steep devaluation) was aimed at meeting IMF requirements.
Going forward, adherence to the IMF program will be crucial for unlocking further funding: successful program reviews can trigger not only IMF tranche releases but also budget support from the World Bank and African Development Bank, as well as bilateral aid. Indeed, international partners (Gulf states, G7 countries, EU, World Bank) coordinate aid with the IMF’s seal of approval. By mid-2024, after policy adjustments, Egypt began receiving portions of a new $8 billion package from the IMF (agreed in March 2024) and related donors. The World Bank and other multilateral development banks are also actively engaged, financing projects and providing policy loans (for energy reform, social protection, etc.). Their involvement not only brings in foreign exchange but also imparts technical advice to address Egypt’s structural issues.
Additionally, Gulf countries have provided central bank deposits and project investments – e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar have collectively deposited over $20 billion in recent years to support Egypt’s reserves. However, these are gradually being transformed into long-term investments rather than short-term loans, per the new strategy of Gulf aid (seeking returns and influence rather than one-off aid). Continued cooperation with international institutions is likely in the medium term as Egypt still faces a financing gap. The positive side of this reliance is that it enforces discipline: Egypt is more likely to implement reforms (such as subsidy cuts or privatizations) under the watchful eye of the IMF. This bodes well for macro stability and thus the EGP’s long-term fundamentals. Moreover, the presence of the IMF program reassures many foreign investors and creditors that Egypt will be supported to avoid a worst-case crisis.
The IMF has a track record in Egypt, having supported a successful stabilization in 2016–2019 that saw inflation fall and the pound regain competitiveness. That said, there are risks: if the government resists some difficult reforms (for example, divestment of military-owned companies or stricter fiscal austerity ahead of elections), the IMF program could go off-track, leading to a loss of confidence. There is also a limit to how much external official aid can substitute for genuine domestic adjustment – ultimately, Egypt needs to generate higher exports and savings to truly shore up the pound.
In summary, IMF and international aid act as critical anchors for the EGP in the medium term, providing funding and policy guidance. As long as Egypt stays engaged with these institutions and meets key reform benchmarks, it can expect financial support that should help stabilize the currency. Any breakdown in this relationship would be a red flag for the EGP, likely prompting depreciation due to lost credibility.
The Egyptian pound’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar has undergone dramatic shifts in the past few years, moving from prolonged stability to rapid depreciation. After several years of trading around EGP 15–16 per USD, the pound’s value plummeted in a series of devaluations since March 2022. Major steps included a devaluation in March 2022 (in response to the Ukraine shock), another in October 2022, a sharp drop in January 2023, and most recently the float in March 2024.
Collectively, these moves saw the official rate weaken from ~EGP 15/$ in early 2022 to about EGP 30/$ by early 2023, and further to ≈EGP 50/$ by early 2024. Each devaluation was aimed at relieving pressure in the FX market and closing the gap with the black market rate. By early 2025, the pound has been trading near EGP 50–51 per USD in official markets, after the latest adjustment.
Looking ahead over the next 1–5 years, the consensus view is that the EGP will remain weak but somewhat more stable, barring major shocks. The baseline expectation is for a continued gentle depreciation of the pound against the dollar, at a slower pace than seen in 2022–2023. This outlook reflects still-high domestic inflation (which tends to erode a currency’s value relative to lower-inflation currencies like the USD) and Egypt’s ongoing external financing needs.
For example, a Reuters poll of analysts in January 2025 projected the pound will weaken to around EGP 52.0 per USD by mid-2025 and to EGP 54.75 by mid-2026. Similarly, Fitch Solutions (BMI Research) expects the EGP to average in the low-50s range through 2025, with a forecast of about EGP 52.5 per USD by end-2025. These forecasts imply a relatively mild depreciation from current levels, assuming Egypt follows through with reforms and maintains investor confidence. The large devaluations already implemented should reduce the need for another abrupt plunge, especially with the IMF monitoring the shift to a flexible regime.
Moreover, if inflation indeed falls into the low double-digits or single digits by 2025, the real exchange rate (inflation-adjusted) might become competitive, reducing pressure for further nominal devaluation.
That said, risks are tilted toward the downside (i.e., a weaker EGP than the base case). In adverse scenarios where reforms stall or external conditions deteriorate, the pound could face more intense pressure. For instance, if foreign investment inflows disappoint and Egypt struggles to roll over external debt, the EGP could slide more significantly to entice capital – potentially moving beyond EGP 60+ per USD over the five-year horizon.
Some analysts have noted that if Egypt fully frees its exchange rate and global risk sentiment worsens, the pound could temporarily overshoot to EGP 55–60 per USD even sooner. It’s also worth noting that, according to Goldman Sachs, the pound was somewhat oversold after the last devaluation, suggesting scope for a near-term rebound if one-off factors subside. Indeed, Goldman’s economists pointed out that seasonal portfolio outflows in late 2024 drove the rate to EGP 50+, and as those outflows abate and interest rate cuts begin, the pound “may rebound” in early 2025. Such a rebound, if it occurs, is likely to be modest (perhaps bringing the rate back into the mid-40s) and short-lived, given the underlying inflation differential between Egypt and the U.S.
In a medium-term optimistic scenario where Egypt over-performs – e.g. faster reform, large FDI inflows, and an export boom – the EGP could stabilize or even strengthen slightly in real terms. But even in that case, it might nominally still weaken a bit each year to offset remaining inflation. In contrast, a pessimistic scenario of reform reversal or external shocks could see the currency depreciate much more rapidly. As of now, international observers generally assume Egypt will muddle through with IMF support, implying no return to a fixed peg and no uncontrolled float either – rather, a managed flexibility that yields a gradual downward drift of the pound.
Price Prediction (EGP/USD) – Based on the above factors, our base-case prediction is that the Egyptian pound will continue to depreciate gradually against the U.S. dollar over the next 1–5 years, but at a more measured pace. By the end of 2025, the exchange rate is expected to be in the low-to-mid 50s (roughly EGP 52–55 per USD), reflecting lingering inflation and high import demand offset by reform progress.
Over a five-year horizon (around 2028–2030), if Egypt stays on the reform path, the EGP may weaken further to around EGP 60 per USD (give or take a few pounds), as cumulative inflation differentials take their toll. This would equate to a moderate single-digit percentage annual depreciation from current levels – a pace that could maintain Egypt’s export competitiveness without spiraling into a crisis. It’s important to underscore that this projection assumes no new major shock. In the event of significant shocks (e.g. a global financial crisis, geopolitical conflict, or a collapse in reform commitments), the pound could hit much lower levels, potentially requiring a swift overshoot beyond the base-case range to restore equilibrium.
Conversely, if Egypt surprises on the upside – taming inflation faster and drawing in extraordinary foreign investment – the EGP might stabilize stronger, perhaps holding in the 40s.
Taking it all together
The Egyptian pound’s medium-term fate hinges on policy discipline and external support. Inflation control and prudent monetary policy will need to restore confidence internally, while fiscal reforms and debt management ease concerns about solvency. The balance of payments must be bolstered by investment, export growth, and external funding to meet obligations. There are reasons for cautious optimism: inflation is coming down from extremes, the CBE’s eventual rate cuts could revive growth, and the IMF-backed reforms – if fully implemented – address many of the structural issues that have historically plagued the pound.
Egypt’s strategic assets (such as the Suez Canal, abundant sunshine for energy, and a large domestic market) provide latent support to the economy. Nonetheless, the path is narrow. The EGP will likely remain undervalued and volatile until trust is rebuilt. Over the next 1–5 years, a realistic expectation is for the Egyptian pound to gradually weaken against the dollar, with the EGP/USD rate moving into the 50s and possibly approaching 60 in the outer years. This trajectory encapsulates the ongoing adjustments needed to correct past imbalances. Should Egypt successfully execute its reform agenda and global conditions stay benign, the pound’s depreciation could slow and stability improve, offering the country a chance to break the cycle of repeated currency crises. Conversely, any faltering on reforms would almost certainly manifest in renewed pressure on the EGP.
Investors and observers will be closely watching indicators like inflation, reserve levels, and IMF review outcomes as barometers of whether the pound’s fundamentals are truly improving. In summary, the Egyptian pound’s medium-to-long term outlook is cautiously stable to gently weaker, heavily contingent on Egypt’s policy choices and external environment, with an expected EGP/USD rate in the mid-50s within the next couple of years and around ~60 in five years under a base-case scenario.
If you are looking for an Egyptian pound forecast to inform your foreign exchange trading, keep in mind that analysts and algorithm-based predictions can be wrong. You should not use Egyptian pound forecasts as a substitute for your own research. Always conduct your own due diligence, looking at the latest news, fundamental and technical analysis, and analyst commentary.
Free Resources
Before you start trading Forex, consider using the educational resources we offer like NAGA Academy or a demo trading account.
- NAGA Academy has lots of trading courses for you to choose from, and they all tackle a different financial concept or process – like the basics of analyses – to help you to make more informed trading decisions.
- Our demo account is a suitable place for you to learn more about leveraged trading, and you’ll be able to get an intimate understanding of how CFDs work – as well as what it’s like to trade with leverage – before risking real capital.
Sources:
Although there is room for growth in developing market currencies, Economic pressures are mounting in Egypt, giving no respite for the Middle East’s most populous nation. Depending on your investing style and time horizon, EGP may or may not be a good fit for your portfolio. Keep in mind that past results do not guarantee future success. Additionally, never trade funds that you cannot afford to lose.
The Egyptian pound is expected to gradually weaken, with the exchange rate reaching approximately EGP 54–55/USD by the end of 2025.
Experts are forecasting the EGP/USD rate to stabilize near the 50.00 mark as the government implements fiscal and monetary reforms.
Read more
Cristian Cochintu
Read more
Cristian Cochintu
Read more
Cristian Cochintu
Copyright © 2024 – All rights reserved.
NAGA is a trademark of The NAGA Group AG, a German based FinTech company publicly listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange | WKN: A161NR | ISIN: DE000A161NR7.
The website is operated by NAGA Markets Europe LTD which is authorised and regulated by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) under licence No. 204/13. The registered address of NAGA Markets Europe LTD is Agias Zonis 11, Limassol 3027, Cyprus. NAGA Markets Europe LTD is also registered with the Romanian Financial Supervisory Authority (“ASF”) with registration no. PJM01SFIM/400019.
Previous Domain: www.nagamarkets.com.
RISK WARNING: CFDs are complex instruments and come with a high risk of losing money rapidly due to leverage. 78.81% of retail investor accounts lose money when trading CFDs with this provider. You should consider whether you understand how CFDs work and whether you can afford to take the high risk of losing your money.
Trading with NAGA Trader by following and/or copying or replicating the trades of other traders involves high levels of risks, even when following and/or copying or replicating the top-performing traders. Such risks include the risk that you may be following/copying the trading decisions of possibly inexperienced/unprofessional traders, or traders whose ultimate purpose or intention, or financial status may differ from yours. Before making an investment decision, you should rely on your own assessment of the person making the trading decisions and the terms of all the legal documentation.
Restricted regions: NAGA Markets Europe LTD offers services to residents within the European Economic Area, excluding Belgium. NAGA Markets Europe LTD does not provide investment and ancillary services in the territories of third countries.
Affiliate programs are not permitted in Spain for the investment service commercialisation or client acquisitions by unauthorised third parties.
Los programas de afiliados no están permitidos en España para la comercialización de servicios de inversión y captación de clientes por parte de terceros no autorizados.